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Marie-Claire Bergère, Capitalismes
et capitalistes en Chine des origines
à nos jours
Lucien Bianco
1 A capitalism without capitalists? This is the paradox that Marie-Claire Bergère invites
us to consider in her latest book, and which eventually persuades us. Certainly there
are capitalists, and outrageously rich ones, too, who show off their riches and go for
ostentatious consumption. But that is precisely the point; many of them give priority to
consumption over accumulation, unlike the Protestant ethic according to Max Weber
or the Confucian virtues of work and saving, because they are only too aware of the
precariousness of their position and the uncertainty looming over their future (p. 322).
2 The state has promoted or protected them — not all, of course, but quite a lot of them;
the political elite has co-opted them or selected them from among its own members (“a
classic merging of elites, which happens after every revolution," p. 306), and they have
to maintain good relations with the decision-makers and power-brokers: one of them,
by no means a minor figure, acknowledges that “he spends two thirds of his time on
political  matters"  (p.  324).  The same state,  or  more precisely  the  same Communist
Party, that welcomes into its midst the “progressive productive forces" (following the
doctrine  of  the  Three  Represents  launched  by  Jiang  Zemin  in  2001)  and  admits
company bosses into its schools (p. 326) may also hurl them down by suspending their
licenses, permits, or market access (“beyond a certain very low threshold, no firm can
develop without support from official agencies," p. 315), or by accusing them of tax
evasion, fraud, smuggling, or anything else.
3 When it is not the government behind some spectacular collapse or other, it is the price
wars,  the  tricky  twists  from  the  competition,  the  thousandand-  one  practices  of
unrestrained  capitalism,  or  the  disastrous  speculative  bids  that  condemn  many
entrepreneurs to a career that is both stormy and short. Moreover, they arouse others’
envy. Those most struck by jealousy see red (hongyan bing, “the red-eyed disease") and
even go so far as to murder the over-achievers. In vain did Deng play the Guizot role,
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while  today’s  government  distributes  honorific  baubles  to  his  “model  creators"  of
money and jobs.1 Twenty-five years of Maoist indoctrination have left their mark, and
egalitarianism pours suspicion on any- one who rises above others. Hatred of the well-
heeled,  the  parasites,  the  privileged,  the  speculators,  and  the  bloodsuckers  is  still
widely shared in China. This feeling does not prevent, however, the worship of money
and the lust for consumption from uniting the well-off with those who aspire to join
them and those who have no chance of doing so. In that respect, the capitalists simply
participate in the most commonly shared tastes and values in China today, and cannot
be credited with any originality in that respect, either (p. 320).
4 Completely at one with run-of-themill opinion, the capitalists are no more inclined to
spurn the goals of the government: economic prosperity and social stability. The main
point is this consensus of the elite. It is a collusion between the government and the
entrepreneurs, which serves as a cover for the subservience of the latter towards the
former. The entrepreneurs are quite the opposite of a “triumphant bourgeoisie with its
own social and political demands" (p. 364). The author mockingly describes them as a
“consenting bourgeoisie" (p. 366). Democracy is not on the agenda.
5 Nor is  revolution,  she adds to  complete  the picture.  Mao once warned that  “if  the
system becomes socialist in name but capitalist in fact, our grandchildren will certainly
rise up." But although the first of his conditions has been met, “the grandchildren are
hardly thinking about revolution" (p.  367).  The poverty carefully preserved by Mao
himself  makes  them  appreciate  all  the  more  that  average  per  capita  income  has
increased eightfold over the last 25 years, and that China is now classified among the
countries with a medium annual income (p. 242). That is the other side of the coin; this
unrestrained,  precarious,  hybrid  capitalism is  nonetheless  a  dynamic  capitalism (p.
267). Far from being a cardboard creature, supported at arm’s length by the state that
has it at its mercy, it is thriving in its own way, and letting China thrive with it. All
things considered, it actually benefits — for the time being — from the state action that
created and controls  it.  That state itself,  without giving any of  its  essential  powers
away, is sufficiently flexible to adapt, and has more or less come to terms with the
possible harm to itself from what it has unleashed.
6 As for the harmful consequences for the people or for the country, or for both, we
should first of all be aware of the very high social costs arising from restructuring the
state sector (p. 251), and secondly, of the enormous environmental damage and the
extreme social inequality caused by the rapid rate of the modernising process, which is
still incomplete: “the conditions for sustainable development are far from being met"
(p.  252).  It  might  be  objected  that  these  are  matters  related  to  the  drawbacks  of
economic modernisation rather than the faults of the capitalists themselves. So let us
add  some  precise  data  well  known  to  the  readers  of  this  journal,  and  eloquently
recalled on pages  279-283 of  the work in question:  the condition of  virtual  slavery
imposed on the workers, male and female, labouring to pay off the debts incurred when
they  were  taken  on,  the  confiscation  of  identity  cards  and  work  and  residential
permits, the working day of 12 hours or more, the stifling, locked dormitories closely
watched by armed guards, the wages paid only months later, and the small, high-risk
mines with death rates as high as 2.2 percent: more than one miner out of every five
hundred!
7 Admittedly  this  description  does  not  cover  the  whole  of  contemporary  Chinese
capitalism, but  only  one  aspect  and  certain  sectors,  and  within  those  sectors  only
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certain enterprises. Apart from these abuses, which evoke shades of Dickens and the
industrial revolution in Europe, this hybrid capitalism, which seems to be a creation of
communist rule,  is  also the inheritor of experiences prior to 1949, or even 1979, in
China: the hesitant first steps and the failures as well as the shortlived successes. It is
here  that  the  first  half  of  the  book,  dealing  with  history,  proves  essential  for
understanding the current phase: “the present day modernisers often find themselves
facing problems already met by the pioneers of the pre-revolutionary epoch [....] and
the power of historical precedent or the simple weight of certain cultural factors still
give rise to practices comparable to a past that is  not so distant after all" (p.  223).
Among those pioneers (who enjoyed limited success), the modernising mandarins such
as  Li  Hongzhang  (Chapter  2)  deserve  just  as  much  attention  as  the  Nationalist
government (Chapter 4). In both cases the role of the state (central or regional) was
preponderant,  just  as  it  is  today,  and  as  it  has  been  in  every  case  of  belated
modernisation (p. 13), from Germany to Japan, and even including France. Conversely,
the ephemeral “golden age" of Chinese capitalism between 1911 and 1927 (Chapter 3)
owed  nothing  to  state  aid  and  even  benefited  from  the  decline  of  the  state.  The
capitalists of those glory days also brought with them the weight of certain cultural
factors, and some of the practices and special features that are still to be found today.
These include the trust in spoken transactions, for example, or the well-known reliance
on networks of family or regional solidarity (nowadays, the Wenzhou network). The
hybrid character of contemporary Chinese capitalism was there from the beginning,
the result of the meeting of two systems, native and imported. Imported, but adapted
with considerable flexibility and pragmatism: “the challenge from the West was taken
up within pre-existing institutions and value systems," and modernisation progressed
for  better  and for  worse  by successive  accommodations  rather  than through sharp
breaks (p. 11).
8 Purists may sniff, but we are certainly a long way from our model capitalism (or to be
more  precise,  the  one  that  developed  in  England).  This  capitalism  with  a  Chinese
flavour deviates decidedly from the sacrosanct principles of economic rationality. The
author of this book is not at all intimidated by rules with universal claims to describe
an ideal entity. She persistently sets about understanding a system existing in reality,
which was established bit by bit, with a good dose of pragmatism (and idiosyncrasy),
and which has proved resilient so far. She makes no apology for an approach focused
on deciphering the real situation. This work is a masterful synthesis, crowning a body
of  work  that  has  always  been careful  to  match first-hand historical  research2 with
reflections on the contemporary world.3 These two concerns come together here and
resonate throughout the book, because the questions the author raises are matters of
concern to one epoch as much as to another, and they often persist across them as the
actors  strain to  find a  solution.  We rediscover them now,  and rediscover ourselves
within them all the more easily thanks to this writer’s lucid language, her controlled
exposition, and the way the turns in her argument always prepare for developments to
come. The reader benefits from the rhetorical ease learnt in Sèvres. As an extra bonus
for those in a hurry who are put off by research, in the space of about 30 pages Chapter
6 provides an excellent introduction to the recent period, which is a veritable historical
guide to the economics of the era of the reforms. So, do I have no criticism at all to
offer  this  author,  who has been my colleague for  the last  half-century? With some
effort I can manage to find an objection to her concluding reference to a “state with
rule of law" (p. 368),  which is rather hastily formulated before being handled more
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circumspectly  (p.  369).  We have  heard  rather  too  much about  this  notion  recently
(because of the Olympic Games, and that torch) and about how human rights are being
frustrated by the so-called Stalinist totalitarianism that is supposed to be rife in China
(Laurent  Joffrin).  But  I  still  find  it  difficult  to  swallow  (and  lend  credibility  to)  a
formulation that I know the Chinese government has made its own.
NOTES
1. It would seem, as Gilles Guiheux suggests, that the entrepreneur replaced Lei Feng as
a model hero (“L’entrepreneur, héros socialiste": a paper given on the occasion to mark
the 100th issue of Perspectives chinoises, Paris, CNRS, 5 March 2008).
2. Of particular note, among others, is her L’Age d’or de la bourgeoisie chinoise,
1911-1927, Paris, Flammarion, 1986.
3. In this respect, among equally numerous publications, Le Mandarin et le
compradore: les enjeux de la crise en Asie Orientale, Paris, Hachette, 1998.
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